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Abstract
Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder suggest that memory biases for negative social 
information contribute to symptoms of social anxiety (SA). However, it remains unclear whether 
memory biases in SA are related to social information, specifically, and if so, whether the 
valence of such information would moderate memory performance. In the present study, 197 
community participants were randomised to imagine themselves as the central character in either 
10 social or 10 non-social scenarios. In both conditions, half of the scenarios ended with 
objectively positive outcomes and half ended with objectively negative outcomes. Results 
demonstrated that higher trait SA was related to memory performance for social scenarios only, 
and in particular to poorer memory for social scenarios that ended positively. Thus, the impact of 
SA on memory performance depended on how social information was framed, with higher SA 
related to poorer memory for positive social experiences. These context-specific effects 
contribute to the growing literature on positivity deficits in SA. 
Keywords: social anxiety, memory bias, positivity deficit, episodic memory, imagined scenarios
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Introduction
High socially anxious (SA) individuals, including those with social anxiety disorder 
(SAD), are preoccupied with the possibility of scrutiny and evaluation in anticipation of and 
during social interaction (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). They have a persistent fear 
of situations where they may be evaluated by others – fear which research has shown is often 
driven by cognitive biases that impact their perceptions of themselves and others within socially 
threatening contexts (Clark & McManus, 2002). 
According to cognitive models of SA (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), 
socially anxious individuals base their perceptions and actions upon negatively distorted mental 
self-images that developed from prior social experiences and are represented in long-term 
memory in a negatively-biased manner (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Hackmann, 
Suraway, & Clark, 1998). These negatively-biased memories are selectively retrieved by high 
SA individuals within anxiety-provoking social contexts, and can inform expectations and 
appraisals of current social and interpersonal demands (Clark, 1999; Mathews & Macleod, 
2005). For example, in anticipation of giving a work presentation, a socially anxious individual 
who worries about appearing awkward may spontaneously and selectively recollect past negative 
experiences in which she felt awkward or behaved in a manner she perceived as being awkward, 
as well as general semantic knowledge or self-schema related to being “an awkward person” that 
is derived from such experiences. This bias toward retrieval of negative information from 
memory serves to increase anxiety and apprehension during social situations (Hirsch & Clark, 
2004) and leads to the exacerbation of negative beliefs as well as maladaptive emotional 
responses and avoidance behaviours (Clark, 1999; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Romano, Ma, 
Moscovitch, & Moscovitch, in press). 
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Given their preferential retrieval of negative social memories, do high SA individuals 
tend to show memory biases for negative social information? Though the literature on episodic 
memory biases in SA is characterised by varied methodological approaches (Morgan, 2010; 
Zlomuzica et al., 2014), some studies have found that high SA individuals exhibit enhanced 
memory for social threat information, such as negative words or critical facial expressions (e.g., 
Lundh & Ӧst, 1996; Mansell & Clark, 1999). Similarly, studies of memory for autobiographical 
past events have dem nstrated that higher trait SA is associated with elevated retrieval of 
threatening and highly emotional material (Krans, de Bree, & Bryant, 2013; Moscovitch et al., 
2018; Wenzel & Cochran, 2006). 
Moscovitch et al. (2018) found that while participants with SAD and healthy controls 
could retrieve autobiographical memories of both aversive and non-aversive social experiences 
with similar ease, SAD participants’ memori s of negative events contained greater episodic 
detail (i.e., more specific information about those particular negative experiences) than memories 
of negative events that were retrieved by controls; however, there were no such differences 
between groups for memories of non-aversive past events. It is unclear, however, whether these 
findings suggest that those with SAD have superior memory for the details of past negative 
events or whether they tend to embellish their memories with details that are consistent with their 
negative self-schemas but may not, in fact, be accurate (e.g., Hertel, Brozovich, Joorman, & 
Gotlib, 2008; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006). Unfortunately, studies of autobiographical 
memories of personal past events rarely measure the accuracy of participants’ reported 
memories, as doing so would require an objective record of the event against which participant 
reports could be compared and verified. Previous work has demonstrated that socially anxious 
individuals’ interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios during encoding often emerge during 
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later recall as negatively-biased memory intrusions which they erroneously assume to be 
accurate (Hertel et al., 2008). Hertel et al.’s findings suggest that episodic memory enhancements 
for negative social material may represent intrusions or embellishments of false but schema-
consistent information rather than enhanced but accurate memory for past negative events, 
though additional research is needed to support this conclusion. 
Another issue requiring empirical clarification is whether enhanced memory for negative 
social information am ng high SA individuals might also extend to negative non-social 
information. Given that individuals with higher levels of SA are prone to negative affect (Brown, 
Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998), they may lack the self-protective tendency to recall events in an 
adaptive manner (e.g., Koban et al., 2017; Wilson & Ross, 2003), which may result in better 
memory for negative emotional material of any sort, even beyond social contexts. However, 
while Hertel and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that participants with SAD showed negative 
interpretations and biased recall for ambiguous social scenarios, non-social scenarios did not 
lend themselves to threatening interpretations or biased recall, which may suggest that such 
biases occur only for social events. Thus, another aim of our study was to examine whether 
enhanced memory recall of negative information among higher SA individuals encompasses any 
negative emotional material or is specific to negative social information.  
A final issue requiring clarification, which we aimed to investigate in the present study, is 
whether the effects of SA on memory biases might also apply to positive social or non-social 
information. Non-anxious individuals often demonstrate a positivity bias that aligns with current 
self-appraisals, recalling events as more positive than they were, irrespective of whether they 
were social or non-social in nature (e.g., Levine, Schmidt, Kang, & Tinti, 2012; Schacter, 
Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011; Wilson & Ross, 2003). A growing body of research has 
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documented a variety of “positivity deficits” for people with higher levels of SA across a range 
of situations and experiences (Kashdan, 2007; Kashdan, Weeks, & Savostyanova, 2011). To this 
end, individuals with high SA or SAD have been shown to underestimate their social 
competence even in positive interactions (Kashdan, Morina, & Priebe, 2009), report fewer and 
less intense positive emotions in response to social experiences (Kashdan & Collins, 2010), 
endorse fewer everyday positive experiences relative to controls (Kashdan & Steger, 2006), and 
demonstrate reduced capacity to savour positive experiences of any nature (Eisner, Johnson, & 
Carver, 2009). Thus, it may be reasonable to predict that higher levels of SA would be associated 
with deficits in the recollection of positive social memories. However, Moscovitch et al. (2018) 
found no differences between SAD and healthy control participants’ recollection of non-negative 
social events about which participants reported little anxiety, though their study did not examine 
memory for objectively positive events. 
Consistent with the positivity deficit hypothesis, recent studies have found that both high 
levels of SA and a clinical diagnosis of SAD predict the erosion of memory for positive feedback 
about social performance (Glazier & Alden, 2017, 2019). In these studies, socially anxious and 
non-anxious participants recalled positive or neutral feedback they received after performing a 
social task. There were no group differences in recall when memory performance was measured 
5 minutes after the task; however, at one week delay, socially anxious participants recalled 
signficantly fewer positive details than non-anxious controls, a difference that did not extend to 
memory for neutral feedback. These findings suggest that SA may erode memory for positive 
elements of social events, which warrants further investigation. 
No studies to our knowledge have examined the relation between trait SA and memory 
for objectively positive events, such as interpersonal successes or social achievements. 
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Therefore, a final aim was to examine whether high levels of trait SA might be associated with 
deficits in memory retrieval for positive social memories. 
The present study
This study examined the conditions under which episodic memory biases might arise for 
individuals with higher levels of SA. Community participants across the SA spectrum were 
randomised to imagine themselves as the central character in 10 social or non-social scenarios. In 
both conditions, half of the scenarios ended with objectively positive outcomes and half ended 
with objectively negative outcomes. Participants were then required to recall or recognise 
various details of each scenario. We hypothesised that higher levels of trait SA would predict 
superior memory for negatively-valenced social scenarios and diminished memory for 
positively-valenced social scenarios, but that SA would not be related to memory outcomes for 
non-social scenarios. We tested these hypoth ses by examining participant performance on three 
memory tasks: (a) free recall of the scenario titles (i.e., themes); (b) recall of the valence of 
scenario outcomes as positive or negative; and (c) recognition of neutrally-valenced scenario 
details. For memory task 1 (free recall of scenario titles), we expected to observe an interactive 
effect of trait SA and scenario context condition, such that higher levels of SA would predict 
greater recall of social scenario titles for scenarios ending with negative outcomes and fewer 
titles for scenarios ending with positive outcomes, but that the effect of SA would not be present 
for non-social scenarios. For memory task 2 (recall of whether the valence of scenario outcomes 
was positive or negative), we expected that higher levels of SA would predict greater accuracy of 
recall for the valence of outcomes of social scenarios that ended negatively and reduced accuracy 
for scenarios that ended positively, but no effects of SA for non-social scenarios regardless of 
outcome valence. For memory task 3 (recognition of neutrally-valenced scenario details), we 
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expected that higher levels of SA would be related to more accurate recognition for neutral 
details of negatively-valenced social scenarios and poorer recognition for neutral details of 
positively-valenced social scenarios; again, we expected a significant interaction, whereby levels 




 A total of 243 community participants were sampled from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Participants were required to: (a) be living in Canada or the US, (b) meet technical 
requirements for completing the online study (e.g., endorsed having access to a secure laptop that 
could play audio files), and (c) have a completion rate of 95% from participation in past MTurk 
studies. 
Measures
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SIAS is a 
commonly used 20-item self-report questionnaire for assessing symptoms of SA. Respondents 
indicate the degree to which 20 statements about anxiety in social interaction situations feel 
characteristic of them on a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 0 = Not at all characteristic 
or true of me to 4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me). The SIAS was administered as part 
of a larger questionnaire battery, completed by participants after the memory recall tasks (α = 
.92). 
Depression Subscale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21-Item Version 
(DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 is a short version of the 42-item 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), which measures 
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depression, anxiety, and stress. The present study used the 7-item depression subscale of the 
DASS-21 to assess depression symptoms. Participants self-reported the degree to which seven 
statements applied to them over the past week on a 4-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 0 = 
Did not apply to me at all to 3 = Applied to me very much or most of the time). The depression 
subscale of the DASS-21 was administered to participants after the memory recall tasks, and was 
included to ensure that participants’ depression symptoms were equivalent across the two 
conditions (α = .94).
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire – Short Version (VVIQ-Short; Reisberg, 
Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). The VVIQ-Short is the 4-item version of the VVIQ (Marks, 1973), a 
self-report questionnaire which assesses the extent to which respondents report being able to 
form clear and vivid images in their minds. Participants are instructed to “visualise a rising sun” 
and then respond to four items regarding the vividness of their mental imagery of that scene on a 
5-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision to 5 = 
No image at all, you only “know” that you are thinking of the object). The VVIQ-Short was 
administered to participants after the memory recall tasks, and was included to establish that 
participants across conditions did not differ in their ability to form clear mental images, as 
participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the lead character within the scenarios 
presented (α = .86).
Data quality check questions. A set of quality and engagement check questions was 
administered at the end of the study in order to ensure participants were paying attention (e.g., 
“As you were going through this psychology study, did you develop any ideas about what we 
might be studying?”), and to request that they self-identify any issues that arose during the study 
that may have compromised the validity of their data (“Should we use your data in our 
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analysis?”). As noted below, some participants were excluded for reporting invalid data due to 
technical issues they experienced with the presentation of study stimuli.
Scenario Stimuli
In each of the two scenario context conditions, participants were presented, one at a time, 
with 10 scenarios, worded in the present tense, for which they were asked to imagine themselves 
as the actor or main character. The instructions encouraged participants to fully immerse 
themselves in the scenarios by imagining the scenarios from a first-person perspective as vividly 
as possible, as if all the events were happening to them. Each scenario was presented 
simultaneously in visual and audio formats, with words both written on screen and read slowly 
aloud in a clear, pre-recorded voice. The scenarios were constructed in a standardised manner to 
contain an equivalent amount of information; thus, the length of each of the audio recordings was 
25 to 30 seconds long across all stimuli. The scenarios were adapted from ambiguous scenarios 
used in past studies of cognitive biases in SA (Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Berna, Lang, 
Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011; Hertel et al., 2008). All participants were randomly assigned to 
receive either social or non-social scenarios. Within each condition, half of the 10 scenarios were 
randomly assigned a positive outcome and the other half were negative. The order of 
presentation of the 10 scenarios differed for every participant. As the study was administered 
online, instructions pertaining to scenario stimuli emphasised the importance of completing the 
task in an environment with minimal distractions. Participants were instructed to pay as close 
attention as possible to each stimulus and were prohibited from taking any notes.
Scenario Structure and Composition
Title and first sentence. All scenarios were preceded by a short title briefly describing 
the key event. The title appeared alone on screen for three seconds before advancing 
Page 11 of 33
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automatically to the next screen containing the first sentence. The first sentence always framed 
the scenario as being either social or non-social but contained no information about whether the 
outcome was negative or positive (i.e., its valence remained ambiguous). Social scenarios were 
described as involving social aspects at their core, where social evaluation by others was a 
possibility. For example, the first sentence of a social scenario entitled “Blind Date” was: You go 
on a blind date. In contrast, a non-social scenario was not social at its core, such that the key 
event involved the person acting alone or did not primarily concern others. For example, the first 
sentence of a non-social scenario entitled “The Wallet” was: You reach for your wallet as you 
leave the house.
Middle steps. Following the presentation of the scenario title and ambiguously-valenced 
first sentence, the screen advanced to the middle steps of the scenario, which were always 
provided in three brief sentences. Like the first sentence, the middle steps were emotionally 
neutral regardless of the scenario’s outcome, meaning that they provided details devoid of 
valenced information that would reflect the outcome of the scenario. Regardless of whether the 
eventual outcome was positive or negative, the middle steps simply described objective events 
that unfolded in the scenario in a manner that was consistent with the context condition for each 
scenario. For example, the middle steps for the scenario “Blind Date” were: You greet your date 
with a handshake. You each talk about your hobbies. You order food and drinks.
Final sentence. Following the neutral middle details, the screen advanced a final time to 
reveal an objectively positive or negative outcome, which disambiguated the valence of the 
scenario and identified the central character’s experience as being either a success or a failure. 
An objectively positive outcome was one where the actor in the scenario achieved or succeeded 
at something meaningful, whereas a negative outcome involved being unsuccessful or failing to 
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achieve something meaningful. For example, the following were the positive and negative 
outcomes for the “Blind Date” and “The Wallet” scenarios:
Blind Date:
Positive outcome: When the date comes to an end, your date tells you they are 
interested in seeing you again. 
Negative outcome: When the date comes to an end, your date tells you they are not 
interested in seeing you again.
The Wallet:
Positive outcome: You grab your wallet and head out the door. 
Negative outcome: You can’t find your wallet and head out the door empty-handed. 
Memory Tasks
Immediately following the presentation of the 10 scenarios, participants were given three 
surprise memory tasks for the encoded material. 
Memory task 1: free recall of scenario titles
Free recall of scenario titles. First, participants were asked to recall as many scenario 
titles (e.g., Blind Date, The Wallet) as they could in an open-ended response box. Of interest for 
data analyses was the number of scenario titles accurately recalled between scenario context 
conditions (social vs. non-social) and across valenced outcomes (positive vs. negative), as a 
function of trait SA.
Scoring procedure. Participants scored 1 point for each scenario they accurately recalled. 
Keywords and themes of the scenarios were considered acceptable responses – for example, both 
“drama” and “play” were considered correct for the scenario “Drama Group” involving a 
community performance. A score out of 5 was calculated for each outcome valence.
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Memory task 2: recall of outcome valence
Recall of outcome valence as positive or negative. Participants were then provided with 
the title and first line of all scenarios they encoded, one at a time, and asked to recall whether the 
outcome for each was positive or negative. Of interest for data analyses was the number of 
scenario outcomes accurately recalled as being either positive or negative between conditions 
and across valenced outcomes, as a function of trait SA. 
Scoring procedure. For each outcome correctly identified as either positive or negative, 
participants were given a score of 1, for a total of 5 per outcome valence. For instance, for 
positively-valenced scenarios, a score of 5 would indicate that the participant accurately recalled 
that all five positively-valenced scenarios ended positively, while a score of 0 would indicate that 
the participant inaccurately identified all the scenarios’ outcomes as negative.
Memory task 3: recognition of middle steps
Recognition of middle steps as old or new. Finally, participants completed a recognition 
memory task. For each scenario that participants had imagined, the title and first line were 
provided in addition to two middle details – one of which had been presented in the original 
scenario (“old”), and the other had not (“new”). For each of the 10 scenarios, participants were 
tasked with deciding whether each of the two middle details presented was old or new, for a total 
of 20 questions in this task. For example, the following were the test items for the “Blind Date” 
and “The Wallet” scenarios:
Blind Date:
You go on a blind date…
a) You each talk about your hobbies. (old)
b) You ask your date about their work. (new)
Page 14 of 33
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The Wallet:
You reach for your wallet as you leave the house…
a) You put on your jacket. (old)
b) You check all your drawers. (new)
Scoring procedure. To examine recognition memory, four different scores were 
calculated for each scenario across outcome valence, which represented the match/mismatch 
between whether the detail was old or new, and whether the detail was identified by participants 
as old or new: hit rate (actually old and identified as old), miss rate (actually old, identified as 
new), correct rejection rate (actually new, identified as new), and false alarm rate (actually new, 
identified as old). Given that we were interested in actual memory for previously encountered 
stimuli and that hit and miss scores represent the inverse of one another, analyses pertained to 
only hit scores. Participants could receive a maximum score of 1 per scenario for a total of 5 per 
outcome valence. A hit score of 5 (corresponding with a miss score of 0) would indicate that the 
participant correctly recalled all the old details as “old.”  
Procedure
The study was hosted online via Qualtrics. After completing a demographics 
questionnaire participants were introduced to the encoding phase of the study, in which they saw 
scenarios they were instructed to imagine and visualise themselves experiencing from a first-
person perspective. Participants first completed a practice trial with two scenarios. Then, 
participants were randomly assigned to imagine either 10 social or non-social scenarios. Each 
scenario stimulus consisted of four parts, presented one at a time and in the following order: the 
title of the scenario, its ambiguously-valenced first sentence (which framed the scenario as social 
or non-social depending on the condition to which participants were assigned), the neutral 
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middle steps bridging the first sentence with the outcome, and the randomised valenced outcome 
(either positive or negative). For each part, content was presented simultaneously both as text on 
screen and as an audio-recording. Following the scenarios, participants completed three surprise 
memory tasks by typing their responses on screen. Finally, they completed a set of 
questionnaires: the SIAS, the DASS-21, the VVIQ-Short, and the data quality check questions, 
which were presented in the same order for every participant. The procedural flow is depicted in 
Figure 1. The total study length was approximately 40 minutes, and participants were 
remunerated $1.50 USD toward their MTurk accounts for their participation. This study was 




Participant characteristics. From the 243 participants recruited from MTurk, 46 were 
excluded from analyses: one was excluded for not giving post-debriefing consent, six were 
identifiable robots, 28 gave unintelligible responses throughout the study, one did not complete 
any memory tasks, and 10 reported technical difficulty with the audio files. The final study 
sample for data analysis, therefore, consisted of 197 participants (98 in the social condition and 
99 in the non-social condition). Of the 197 participants, there was missing data pertaining to one 
participant’s age (social condition) and two participants’ SIAS scores (non-social condition). 
Equivalence of conditions. As shown in Table 1, there were no significant differences 
between participants across the social and non-social conditions in demographic characteristics 
or in responses to symptom measures (SIAS, DASS) or imagery ability (VVIQ-Short).  
Main analyses
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The study was based on a 2x2 mixed multifactorial design. The between-subjects factor 
was scenario context condition (social vs. non-social), and the within-subjects factor was 
scenario outcome valence (negative vs. positive). Trait SA was used as a continuous predictor of 
the three different memory outcomes for positive and negative social scenarios separately. 
The data for all memory tasks were analysed using hierarchical linear regressions with 
SIAS scores and scenario context condition (social vs. non-social) entered in the first step and 
the interaction between these two variables entered into the second step. Positive and negative 
memory outcomes for each memory task were entered as the dependent variable in each 
regression model, with separate regression analyses conducted for positive memory outcomes 
and then negative memory outcomes. Significant interactions were probed by running separate 
regression analyses for the social and non-social conditions in which we examined the influence 
of SIAS scores on each condition in turn.
Memory Task 1: Free Recall of Scenario Titles
Positive outcomes: Step 1 of the hierarchical regression model was significant (F(2, 192) 
= 4.24, p = .016), accounting for 4.2% of the overall variance in free recall of positive 
outcome scenario titles. The SIAS x condition interaction term was entered into the 
second step of the regression model. When including the interaction term, the model 
was statistically significant (F(3, 191) = 4.35, p = .005) and accounted for 2.2% additional 
variance (ΔR2 = .022; ΔF(1, 191) = 4.43, p = .037). Parameter estimates in the second step 
indicated a significant main effect of SIAS, where higher scores predicted worse 
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memory performance (β = -0.30, t = -3.02, p = .003), a non-significant effect of condition (β = 
-0.13, t = -1.89, p = .062), and a significant interaction between SIAS and condition (β = 0.21, t 
= 2.11, p = .037). To probe the nature of the interaction we first examined the effect of SIAS in 
the social condition. The results demonstrated that higher SIAS scores significantly predicted 
poorer recall of positive scenario outcome titles (F(1, 96) = 9.43, β = -0.30, t = -3.07, p = .003), 
accounting for 8.9% of the variance. In the non-social condition, however, SIAS scores did not 
significantly predict memory for outcome titles (F(1, 95) = 0.00, β = -0.00, t = -0.02, p = .981).
Negative outcomes: In the model examining the effects of SIAS, condition, and their 
interaction predicting free recall of scenario titles for scenarios ending negatively, steps 1 and 2 
were both non-significant (F’s < 1.26, p’s > .290).
Memory Task 2: Recall of Outcome Valence 
Positive outcomes: Step 1 of the hierarchical regression model was significant (F(2, 192) 
= 7.25, p = .001) and accounted for 7.0% of the variance in the correct recall of positive 
scenario outcome valence. The SIAS x condition interaction term was entered into the 
second step of the regression model. This model was statistically significant (F(3, 191) = 
6.04, p = .001) and accounted for 1.6% additional variance, although the change in R2 
was not significant (ΔR2 = .016; ΔF(1, 191) = 3.43, p = .066). Parameter estimates in the 
second step indicated a significant main effect of SIAS where higher scores predicted 
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poorer memory performance (β = -0.39, t = -4.00, p < .001), a non-significant effect of 
condition (β = -0.03, t = -0.42, p = .678) and a marginally significant interaction between SIAS 
and condition (β = 0.18, t = 1.85, p = .066)1. 
Negative outcomes: In the model predicting the correct recall of scenario outcomes for 
scenarios ending negatively, step 1 was significant (F(2, 192) = 3.44, p = .034), and accounted 
for 3.5% of the variance. While the overall model for step 2 was significant (F(3, 191) = 2.70, p = 
.047), the addition of the interaction term was non-significant (ΔR2 = .006; ΔF(1, 191) = 1.21, p = 
.273). Parameter estimates in the second step indicated a significant effect of condition (β = 
0.16, t = 2.24, p = .027), where the non-social condition was related to better memory for 
scenario outcomes; however, SIAS scores did not predict significant variance in memory for 
scenario outcomes (β = -0.18, t = -1.82, p = .070), nor did the interaction between SIAS scores 
and condition (β = 0.11, t = 1.10, p = .273).
Memory Task 3: Recognition of Middle Steps
Hit rate for positive scenarios. Step 1 of the hierarchical regression model was 
significant (F(2, 192) = 3.70, p = .026) and accounted for 3.7% of the variance towards 
1Although the interaction did not quite reach the required threshold for statistical significance, we nonetheless 
assessed whether the nature of the interaction was consistent with the results for memory task 1. We therefore 
probed the nature of the interaction by first examining the effect of SIAS in the social condition. The results 
demonstrated that SIAS scores were a significant predictor of the recall of positive scenario outcomes (β = -0.41, t = 
-4.41, p < .001), accounting for 16.8% of the variance. In the non-social condition, SIAS scores did not significantly 
predict memory for positive outcomes (β = -0.13, t = -1.23, p = .221).   
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correct identification of middles steps for positive scenarios. The SIAS x condition 
interaction term was entered into the second step of the regression model. Step 2 was 
significant (F(3, 191) = 4.23, p = .006) and accounted for 2.5% additional variance (ΔR2 = 
.025; ΔF(1, 191) = 5.12, p = .025). Parameter estimates in the second step indicated a 
significant main effect of SIAS, where higher SIAS scores predicted poorer memory 
performance (β = -0.33, t = -3.31, p = .001), a non-significant main effect of condition (β = 
0.10, t = 1.41, p = .161), and a significant interaction between SIAS and condition (β = 0.22, t = 
2.26, p = .025). To probe the nature of the interaction, we first examined the effect of SIAS in the 
social condition. The results demonstrated that higher SIAS scores significantly predicted poorer 
recognition of middle steps for positive social scenarios (F(1, 96) = 10.73, β = -0.32, t = -3.28, p 
= .001), accounting for 10.1% of the variance. For non-social scenarios, however, SIAS scores 
did not significantly predict recognition of middle steps for positive scenarios (F(1, 95) = 0.01, β 
= -0.01, t = -0.09, p = .929). 
Hit rate for negative scenarios. Step 1 of the hierarchical regression model was non-
significant (F(2, 192) = 1.95, p = .146), accounting for only 2.0% of the variance towards 
correct identification of middle steps for negative scenarios. The SIAS x condition 
interaction term was entered into the second step of the regression model. This model 
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was statistically significant (F(3, 191) = 2.91, p = .036) and accounted for 2.4% additional 
variance (ΔR2 = .024; ΔF(1, 191) = 4.75, p = .030). Parameter estimates in the second step 
indicated a significant main effect of SIAS where higher SIAS scores predicted poorer 
memory performance (β = -0.23, t = -2.33, p = .021), a non-significant main effect of condition 
(β = 0.12, t = 1.69, p = .092), as well as a significant interaction between SIAS and condition (β 
= 0.22, t = 2.18, p = .030). To probe the nature of the interaction we first examined the effect of 
SIAS in the social condition. Mirroring results for positive scenarios, results demonstrated that 
higher SIAS scores significantly predicted poorer recognition of middle steps for negative 
scenarios (F(1, 96) = 5.32, β = -0.23, t = -2.31, p = .023), accounting for 5.2% of the variance. In 
the non-social condition, however, SIAS scores did not significantly predict recognition of 
middle steps for negative scenarios (F(1, 95) = 0.60, β = 0.08, t = 0.77, p = .442).
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated the effects of trait SA and social context on episodic 
memory performance for positively and negatively-valenced scenarios that were encoded by 
participants who imagined themselves as the central character. We predicted that participants 
with higher levels of SA would demonstrate superior memory performance for negatively-
valenced scenarios and poorer memory for positively-valenced scenarios, but that these effects 
would only emerge when scenarios were embedded within a social context. We expected similar 
patterns of performance for each of the three memory tasks: recalling the titles of encoded 
scenarios, recalling their outcome valence, and correctly identifying their neutral details. 
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Supporting cognitive models of SA, which stipulate that the emergence of memory biases 
is likely to occur only under conditions in which threat appraisals are activated (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), we observed a significant interaction between SA and 
condition across all three memory tasks, such that SA was related to memory only for social 
scenarios and not for non-social scenarios. Furthermore, across the memory tasks, higher levels 
of SA predicted worse memory performance when social scenarios were positively-valenced. 
Though the interaction between SIAS and condition predicting task 2 memory for positive 
scenario valence only approached significance, probing the interaction revealed that SIAS scores 
significantly predicted the recall of positive scenario outcomes. Contrary to our hypotheses, 
however, higher SA did not predict memory enhancements for social scenarios that were 
negatively-valenced for any of the tasks. 
It may be useful to conceptualise thes  results within the context of research on positivity 
deficits in SA (Kashdan, 2007). Studies have shown that high SA individuals experience 
diminished positive affect and curiosity in response to social experiences (Kashdan & Collins, 
2010; Kashdan et al., 2009). Kashdan and colleagues have argued that positivity deficits might 
arise because social contexts prime socially anxious individuals’ use of self-regulatory strategies 
geared toward self-protection and avoidance, which deplete the resources required for attending 
to and processing positive social cues (see Goodman, Doorley, & Kashdan, 2018). Our findings 
suggest that poorer memory for positive social events among higher SA individuals may be 
another piece of this emerging puzzle. 
These memory deficits for positive social scenarios did not extend to non-social 
situations, thus demonstrating a context-specific effect. Positive social information may be less 
memorable for higher SA individuals because such information is less coherent with the negative 
Page 22 of 33






























































For Peer Review Only
MEMORY BIASES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY
22
social self-schema that are held by individuals with high levels of SA (e.g., Conway, 2005; 
Wilson & Ross, 2003). These findings align with two recent studies that found high SA 
individuals’ memory for positive feedback following a social task in the laboratory tended to 
erode over time in relation to non-anxious controls, with no differences in memory for neutral 
feedback emerging at either immediate or delayed recall (Glazier & Alden, 2017, 2019). 
Contrary to hypotheses, higher SA was generally not related to memory performance for 
negatively valenced s cial situations. One exception was for task 3, in which higher SA was 
associated with poorer recognition of neutral details for both negative and positive social 
scenarios. It is unclear why this one memory task elicited degraded memory performance among 
higher SA individuals for social scenarios of any sort, particularly in light of our prediction that 
higher SA would predict superior memory for negative social scenarios only. It is possible that 
the cognitive demands of this particular task differed from those of the other two in ways that 
made high SA participants more vulnerable to the impact of interpretation bias or rumination. 
These cognitive processes commonly seen in high SA individuals have been found to affect 
memory accuracy among high SA participants for social information of any sort, irrespective of 
valence (e.g., Mansell & Clark, 1999; Mellings & Alden, 2000).  
The present study was limited by its focus on the nature and quality of episodic non-
autobiographical memories that did not require participants to engage in “mental time travel” to 
extract details from their own personal past. It is possible that mental time travel is a crucial 
component of memory biases for negative social information in SA, and that failure to support 
our hypothesis that higher SA would be associated with enhanced memory performance for 
negative social stimuli, as hasbeen shown for negative autobiographical memory details in 
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previous studies (Moscovitch et al., 2018), may have been due to our focus on episodic memory 
for imagined scenarios rather than personally experienced social events. 
Another potential limitation of the current study was that the ambiguous scenarios were 
only disambiguated in the final sentence; in other words, at a later stage of encoding than the 
neutral middle steps. Thus, encoding of these imagined scenarios may differ from real-life 
anxiety-provoking social situations in so far as the details of the former were not imbued with 
negative interpretation at the time they were encoded, whereas negative autobiographical events 
are always encoded in the presence of negative interpretation and the activation of high negative 
affect. Thus, it may be that negative interpretation and negative affect at the time of encoding are 
essential for inducing enhanced memory of such experiences. Future studies could extend our 
work by examining whether presenting a valenced cue that informs participants that the outcome 
will be positive or negative results in different types of memory biases if the cue is presented 
either before or after the processing and encoding of scenario details, or by comparing memory 
performance if scenarios are encoded while negative affect is high or low. 
Finally, this study was conducted online, which limits our ability to draw conclusions 
about participants’ engagement in the encoding task. We did not wish to interrupt participants’ 
immersion in the task by embedding attention checks between scenarios, but in accordance with 
research on self-focused attention, it is possible that high SA participants for whom the social 
condition may have been particularly anxiety-provoking could have disengaged their attention 
from the task, thus impairing their recall on subsequent memory tasks. Our study design and 
measures do not permit any firm conclusions about the relations between memory performance, 
state arousal, and attentional engagement. Similarly, we cannot ascertain the degree to which 
participants immersed themselves when they were asked to imagine the social scenarios. It is 
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possible that participants solely read the text prompts for the scenario displayed on scene, as 
opposed to engaging their imagination and vividly bringing to mind each of the scenarios. 
While a strength of our paradigm is that it enabled us to verify the accuracy of 
participants’ memories of scenarios, which is unfeasible in studies on autobiographical memory, 
future extensions of the current study could also examine the veracity of participants’ memories 
for social and non-social scenarios by coding for intrusions and embellishments in their recall of 
these events; in so doing, a more fine-grained pattern of memory biases may emerge that would 
not be captured by solely scoring the amount of information recollected. Future studies using 
adaptations of this paradigm should also continue to explore the boundary conditions under 
which episodic memory biases occur in high SA individuals. In particular, research is needed to 
understand the causes and real-life consequences of memory performance deficits for positive 
social events for socially anxious individuals. If it can be established that the effects observed 
here might extend as well to individuals with a clinical diagnosis of SAD, future work must 
explore whether interventions can be designed to boost memory for positive social experiences 
and the potential benefits of such interventions for improving patients’ lives. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the study sample overall and in each condition separately
Overall sample






Age in years: M (SD)a 37.51 (11.51) 37.06 (11.20) 37.95 (11.85) t(194) = -0.54, p =.591
Gender (% female) 61.4 60.2 62.6 χ2(4) = 3.19, p = .526
Ethnicityb χ2(8)  = 8.39, p = .396
   White/European 75.1 70.4 79.8
   Black 11.7 15.3 8.1
   Asian 4.6 4.1 5.1
   Otherc 8.1 9.2 7.0
Education χ2 (5) =  7.01, p = .220
   High-school graduate 16.8 14.3 19.2
   Some college/university education 32.0 29.6 34.3
   Degree from college or university 39.6 39.8 39.4
   Post-graduate degree 10.7 15.3 6.1
Employment status χ2(6)  =  4.23, p = .645
   Employed full/part-time or self-
employed
83.7 85.7 81.6
   Full-time home duties 5.1 4.1 6.1
   Full-time student 2.6 3.1 2.0
   Unemployed 3.1 1.0 5.1
   Retired 2.6 3.1 2.0
Marital status χ2 (4) = 5.80, p = .215
   Married/common law/engaged or 
   in committed relationship
55.3 56.1 54.5
   Single 34.5 31.6 37.4
   Divorced/separated 7.6 11.2 4.0
 Self-report measures
   SIAS 27.39 (16.16) 26.66 (16.27) 28.13 (16.11) t(193) = -0.63, p = .527
   DASS-D 8.55 (10.35) 8.22 (10.55) 8.87 (10.19) t(195) = -0.44, p = .663
   VVIQ-Short 12.66 (4.80) 12.66 (4.70) 12.66 (4.93) t(195) = 0.01, p = .992
Note. SIAS= Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; DASS-D = Depression subscale of the Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress Scale – Short Version; VVIQ-Short = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
aAge missing for one person in social condition.
bEthnic groups are based on Canadian census categories.
c “Other” includes South Asian; Southeast Asian; Filipino; Indigenous/First nations; Hispanic; 
“multiracial”; “biracial”.
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Figure 1. Study flow and procedure.
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Middle steps 
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98 participants 99 participants
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